Groups of Related Enforcement Actions | Profit from Bribes |
---|---|
Ashland Oil's Involvement in Oman between 1980 and 1982 | |
CAAEF's Involvement in the United Kingdom between 1996 and 1998 | |
Goodyear's Involvement in Iraq in 1978 | |
Young & Rubicam's Involvement in Jamaica between 1980 and 1989 | |
Eagle Bus' Involvement in Canada in 1989 | |
F.G. Mason Engineering's Involvement in Germany between 1983 and 1989 | |
Harris Corporation's Involvement in Colombia in 1989 | |
General Electric's Involvement in Israel in 1984 | |
American Totalisator's Involvement in Greece in 1985 | |
Vitusa's Involvement in the Dominican Republic in 1992 | |
Montedison's Involvement in Italy in 1998 | |
Triton's Involvement in Indonesia in 1989 | |
Control Systems Specialist's Involvement in Brazil in 1994 | |
Saybolt's Involvement in Panama in 1994 | |
Tanner Management Corporation's Involvement in Argentina in 1996 | |
IBM's Involvement in Argentina in 1994 | |
Allied Products' Involvement in Russia in 1992 | |
American Bank Note's Involvement in Saudi Arabia in 1998 | |
American Rice's Involvement in Haiti in 1998 | |
Chiquita Brands International's Involvement in Colombia from 1995 to 1996 | |
Owl Securities and Investment's Involvement in Costa Rica in 1997 | |
International Materials Solutions' Involvement in Brazil in 1995 | |
BellSouth's Involvement in Nicaragua in 1997 | |
Syncor International's Involvement in Multiple Countries between 1985 and 2002 | |
BJ Services's Involvement in Argentina from 1998 to 2002 | |
HealthSouth's Involvement in Saudi Arabia from 2000 to 2003 | |
Invision's Involvement in China, Philippines, Thailand between 2001 and 2004 | |
Schering-Plough's Involvement in Poland from 1999 to 2002 | |
Micrus' Involvement in Multiple Countries from 2002 to 2004 | |
Monsanto's Involvement in Indonesia from 1997 to 2002 |
For each profit range represented on the navigation bar, this heat map identifies the number of groups of related Enforcement Actions filed since the statute's enactment that allege a dollar value for total profit earned from the bribery that falls within that range. The navigation bar organizes the data by count and color, putting the profit range with the largest number of groups of related Enforcement Actions at the top in red, and the profit range with the fewest number of groups of related Enforcement Actions on the bottom in yellow. Profit values are culled from Enforcement Actions linked to FCPA Matters and are adjusted to avoid double counting that could otherwise occur when, for example, the same or affiliated defendants are sued in different Enforcement Actions for the same underlying misconduct. Profit values referenced in FCPA-related Investigations are excluded from this analysis. Profit that might have been earned from offers or promises to pay bribes that are not actually paid are excluded from the totals to the extent they can be segregated. Profit totals include all profit earned from completed bribery payments that allegedly violate any provision of the FCPA (including bribery payments that are made to private individuals in violation of the books and records or internal controls provisions of the FCPA). The data used to generate this graphic were culled from publicly available documents filed in connection with the Enforcement Actions, and may not reflect all bribery payments that were offered or made. "No profit" means that no profit was earned from bribery payments alleged in the Enforcement Actions. Enforcement Actions for which no total profit value is disclosed are not included on the navigation bar, but are included in the list of Total Related Enforcement Actions. See About Us - Datasets for the definition of "Enforcement Action."